DUE PROCESS TESTS OF STATE TAXATION, 1922-1925*
II
The two most fundamental and far-reaching issues of dueprocess limitations on state taxing power are those relating to the
purpose for which the tax is levied and to the presence or absence
of jurisdiction to tax the person or the property or the enterprise
involved. Cases which limit the states in these respects affect the
very substance of state power. For the most part they require a
state to forego something it has undertaken and not merely to
adopt some different way to achieve it. On the other hand the
cases which remain fbr recital have to do mainly with matters
that at most require some amendment to enable the state to proceed with its fiscal plans. Sometimes, the amendment may let
some small class of taxpayers go scot-free, as when a tax is condemned for retroactivity; but usually the amendment will enable
the state to achieve at least the major part of what it is after. An
assessment which is invaiid because of some defect in the opportunity for notice and hearing may be corrected by compliance
with correct canons. What is bad because done in the wrong way
may be made good by being done in the right way. It may be, of
course, that the right way will result in a smaller tax than that
imposed in the wrong way, but this represents a loss confined -to
a particular assessment and not a loss that cuts into the general
tax plan.
It is obvious that due-process is as silent about the method of
assessing and collecting taxes as it is about the taxes that may be
assessed and collected. The cases to follow, while technically interpretations of the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are the product of the Supreme Court's conceptions of
fairness and decency in dealing with taxpayers. From this it is
not to be assumed that the Supreme Court regards as desirable
*Continued from 74 U. PA. L. REv. 423 (1926). Supreme Court decisions
June, 1925,
on the equal-protection tests of state taxation from October, 1922, toRaiEw
for
are to be reviewed in two articles to appear in the VIR IA LAw
April and May, 1926.
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everything thit it refuses to condemn. The standard of constitutional correctness is not the standard of perfection, if indeed
such a standard could be devised. States are allowed a wide latitude in choosing their methods of assessment and collection of
taxes. Though most of the protestations of taxpayers which
win the snub of the cold judicial shoulder are quite patently finical and fatuous, some of them are complaints which merit solace
from the state even though such solace is wisely withheld by the
judges. The states should not take constitutional condonation as
a sure sign of the fairness or desirability of the methods and results that are thus put within their constitutional power. The
cases to follow deserve consideration, less for the constitutional
law laid down, than for their exposition of the situations which
arise in the assessment and collection of taxes and for the light
they may throw on the practical merits and defects of current
ways of levying taxes and current ways of affording relief to taxpayers.
III.

RETROACTIVE TAXATION

Complaints against retroactivity in.taxation may be directed
merely against the alleged unfairness of refusing to let bygones be bygones, or they may involve a charge that the nuncprotuncness is a device for achieving indirectly something that
the state cannot do directly. Retroactive taxation by the United
States may raise the question whether a tax in form indirect is
not in substance direct.1 This technical ground of objection is
'See Lewell)m v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. 487 (1925), 74 U. oF PA.
L. Rev. igg (1925), in which the proceeds of insurance policies in which
the beneficiary had a vested interest prior to the enactment of the Federal
Estates Tax part of the Revenue Act of February 24, i919, were excluded from
the broad provisions of the Act so as to avoid the grave constitutional doubts
that would arise as to whether retroactive taxation would violate the Fifth
Amendment and the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned. In the opinion
are cited earlier cases dealing similarly with various types of transfers in
anticipation of death. These cases are catalogued in 21 MICi. L. REV. 297,
note 62 (1923). Retroactive federal taxation is considered in Julius H. Amberg,
Retroactihe Excise Taxation, 37 HAM. L. Rev. 691 (19z4); Edwin IMt.Ashcraft, Federal Estates Tax on Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 6 ILi L. Q.
253 (1924); Robert Walston Chubb, Rctrospective Succession Taxes, lo ST.
Lois L. Rev. 249 (1925) ; Charles Robinson Smith, Retroactive Income Taxation (So-Called), 33 YALE L. J. 35 (1924); and notes in 9 CALIF. L Rev.
489 (1921) ; 37 HARV. L. REv. 628, 917 (1924) ; and 19 ILL. L REv. 287 (1924).
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not available against state taxation, but it may be alleged that a
state tax on past acts or the fruits thereof imposes a special burden on selected enterprisers without the warning needed to enable
them to plan to meet the burden, or that a tax on property for
past improvements puts the burden where it does not properly
belong. The ideas of fairness implicit in such objections are
recognized by the canon of statutory construction that a tax statute will not be construed retroactively if the words permit it to be
confined to a prospective construction. It is not, however, a universal rule that retroactive taxation is a denial of due process of
law.2 Often the question at issue between the state and the taxpayer is whether the imposition complained of is in substafice
retroactive.
We are familiar with the phenomenon of congressional inability to settle the details of the federal income tax until after
the close of the period for which the income is to be computed.
Without any revelation of careful reasons to justify such retroactivity, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the practice where
3
there was power to levy the tax at the beginning of the period.
It is therefore not surprising that in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co. v. Daughton,4 Mr. Justice Brandeis, without discussion or citation of precedents, left unsolaced an objection to the retroac'Retroactive state taxation is discussed in some of the articles and notes

listed in note I, supra, and in Russell M. Bradford, Evolution of the Words
"Gifts Made in Contemplation of Death" in Inheritance Tax Legislation, 9 VA.
L REV. 267 (1923) ; Edmund B. Shea, The Validity of an Inheritance Tax on
Gifts Inter Vivos Within Six Yeari of Death, 9 M.RQUErTE L. J. 1 (1(.924) ;
notes on gifts in contemplation of death in 10 CORNELL L.Q. 83 (1924), and 71
U. OF PA. L. REV. 404 (1923) ; on legacy pursuant to previous agreement in 12
CALir. L. REV. 233 (1923); on effect of consideration for transfer by" will in 37
HAR*v. L. REv. 507 (1924); on remainders vested prior to statute in 36 HAiv. L
REv. 602, 6o8 (1923), and 7 MiNK. L. REv. 598 (1923) ; power of appointment
under a will in 34 YALE L. J. 107 (1924) ; land acquired under an oral trust during lifetime of trustor in 32 YALE L. J. 415 (1923) ; joint bank account in 2
CoL. L. Rav. 768 (1922) ; tenants by entirety in 24 CoL. L. REV. 209 (1924) ;
homestead in 9 Mi.,. L. REv. 168 (1924); property taken by widow under the
will by election in lieu of dower in 9 VA. L. REv. 658 (1924). A retroactive
state tax on gasoline is discussed in 23 Coi. L REv. 595 (1923). Prospective
taxation of contingent remainders is treated in 32 YALE L J. 847 (1923).
'Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 20, 36 Sup. CL 236
(19x6), citing Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 2o AVall. 323, 331 (1873).
'262 U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct. 62o (1923).
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tivity of a state income tax enacted in March and based on the
income for the preceding calendar year.
The power of the legislature by a curative statute to validate
an assessment that initially may have been defective under state
law, owing to inclusion in the district of territory already included
in another, was affirmed in Charlotte Harbor & Northern Railway Co. v. Wells. 5 Mr. Justice McKenna declared that the case
comes within "the general and established proposition" that
"what the legislature could have authorized it can ratify, if it can
authorize at the time of ratification"; to which he added that "the
power is necessary that government may not be defeated by omissions or inaccuracies in the exercise of functions necessary to its
administration." This was distinguished from a case in which it
was held that the right to recover tolls invalidly exacted could not
be extinguished by a retroactive authorization to exact them,
since that was an attempt "to turn a gratuity conferred and enjoyed into a legal obligation," while this was merely remedying a
defect in the steps necessary to create a legal obligation.
If, however, a retroactive assessment for a special improvement is sought to be applied to lands that were constitutionally
exempt from taxation at the time the improvement was made, it
appears from Lee v. Osceola & Little River Road Improvement
Districtothat the assessment will be found wanting in due process
of law. This was a case in which the original assessment on the
lands in question was abandoned because it was discovered that
the lands belonged to the United States and were therefore immune from special assessments imposed under state law, notwithstanding the fact that they were specially benefited by the improvement. After the completion of the improvements the
United States conveyed the lands to private owners. Thereupon
the District undertook a re-assessment to which the owners objected. Mr. Justice Sanford pointed out that the exemption of
the lands while in the ownership of the United States would be
ineffective unless the United States could convey them free from
liability to assessment for improvements prior to the conveyance.
'26a U. S. 8, 43 Sup. Ct. 3 (1922).
268 U. S. 643, 45 Sup. Ct 62o (1925).

o
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The interest of the United States requires that its immunity from
taxation shall attach to the land itself. To impose on subsequent
vendees a tax which is for improvements made when the United
States was owner would be to "accomplish indirectly the collection of a tax against the United States which could not be directly
imposed." This would seem to be in itself a sufficient ground for
the decision, so that the case might have been rested solely on the
immunity of federal instrumentalities and property from state
taxation. So far as appears, however, the only ground on which
the tax was resisted was the due-process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Mr. Justice Sanford declares that, since the tax
is beyond the constitutional authority of the state, "its exaction
is a taking of property without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
One of the modes of preventing tax evasion and ensuring
collection is the so-called Ferret Act which secures from tle estates of decedents some equivalent for the taxes which should
have been paid on their property during their lifetime. The
7
Connecticut device sustained in Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett
made the property liable to a flat tax of two per cent. for each
of the five past years during which it had escaped assessment. To
the complaint that this deprived creditors and distributees of
property without due process by exacting from them a penalty
for the default of another, Mr. Justice McKenna answered that
the property does not belong to creditors or distributees until it
has met obligations properily chargeable upon it. In discussing
the possible want of correspondence between the exaction under
the Ferret Act and the taxes due during the lifetime of the
decedent, he called the provision a "way of fixing a. penalty for
the delinquency, which it is competent for the state to do." Complaint founded on the ex-post-facto clause was cared for by saying that the demand was not imposed as punishment for crime.

IV. AssEssMENT
Complaints here gathered together under the head of assessment fall into the two main classes of procedure and substance.
'6o

U. S. 647, 43 Sup. Ct. 233 (1923).
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It may be assumed that what the taxpayer really cares about is the
substance, and that objections to procedure have their only adequate foundation in the possibility that a different procedure
might have resulted in a lower tax. Nevertheless there are canons of proper procedure which must be followed even though it
is not shown that the tax is excessive. So also the propriety of
the statutory mode of assessment does not necessarily establish
the propriety of the result. Objections to alleged incompleteness
or indefiniteness of the tax statute or to the want of satisfactory
opportunity to be heard before the assessing bodies relate to matters of procedure. Objections to the quantum of the assessment
may relate to the statutory mode by which it is arrived at or may
be confined to allegations of fallibility on the part of the officials
in the application of a concededly proper statute.
i. IncompIcteness or Indefiniteness of Tax Statute
Statutory delegation to a state Department of Conservation
to make rules and regulations for the assessment of a severance
tax on skins and hides of fur-bearing animals was sustained in
Lacoste v. Department of Conservation 8 with the comment that
it is not shown that the department "has made or proposes to
apply, any unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary rules, regulations, or methods of valuation for the purpose of arriving at the
amount of the tax or for enforcing its payment." The power
vested included the ascertainment of prices paid for the skins
and the determination of the time and manner of paying the tax.
The rules required that all shipments of hides have attached to
them a label or certificate showing the payment of the tax and
prohibited carriers from accepting shipments not so labelled.
Under a statute in which the rate of a tax on express companies was fixed in part by reference to a classification of the
railroads on which the express companies did business, there was
the contention that the statute itself was vague and indefinite for
failure to set forth a standard or measure by which to classify
the railroads. To this, Mr. Justice Brandeis answered in Southa263 U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. x86 (1924). The delegation of powers in the
federal tariff act is reviewed in 23 CoL.L.REv. 66 (1923).
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eastern E.rpress Co. v. Miller 9 that "if it can be conceded to the
Express Company that the statute had vagueness it was competent for the [state] court to resolve it to clearness which it did by
an explanation of the laws and the relation of their provisions,
and deduced therefrom their constitutionality and freedom from
the objections urged against them." The state court had held
that the railroad classification was that undertaken by the railroad
commission for railroad purposes. The condonation of the Supreme Court necessarily holds that the classification for that purpose may be adopted by inexplicit reference as the classification"
10
for the tax on the express companies.
Another claim that a statute was void for uncertainty in not
specifying distinctly just what sales of gasoline were subject to
taxation was declared in Pierce Oil Corporation v. Hopkins 11 to
be "answered by the fact that since the judgment was entered in
the trial court, all uncertainty has been removed by the decision
of the highest court of the state" to the effect that sellers are required to "collect and pay the tax only on such gasoline as they
have reason to believe purchasers from them will use in motors
on the highways." Though Mr. Justice Brandeis observes that
this "claim that the law is void for uncertainty is not urged as a
violation of the due-process clause," it seems safe to assume that
it would not have been more successful if that clause had been its
alleged basis.
2. Notice and Hearing

Absence of an opportunity to be heard before the assessment
became final was condoned in three cases where the tax was either
a specific tax or fixed by reference to some predetermined standard which could not be affected by any evidence offered by the
2
taxpayer. In Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester ' an apportionment of benefits from a sewer serving a large area was made by
264 U. S. 535, 44 Sup. Ct. 42x (924).
The question whether a state tax law may adopt in advance the schedules
of future federal tax laws is discussed in 36 HARV. L. REv. 752 (1923).
L. REv. M8 (1924).
1264 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 251 (1924). See 22 MicH.
22261 U. S. 155, 43 Sup. Ct. 261 (1923).
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the legislature on a flat basis of the assessed value of the property
including improvements. To a landowner who objected that he
had no opportunity to be heard as to the sewer assessment, Mr.
Justice 'McReynolds answered that this was unnecessary, since
the assessment according to valuation was proper and the tight
to be heard before the local assessors who fixed the valuation for
the general property tax is all that the property owner is entitled
to.
The privilege tax on express companies unsuccessfully contested in Southeastern Express Co. v. Miller 13 was a flat fee of
$500 plus $6 per mile for so-called first-class railroad tracks over
which the express company did business and $3 per mile on second-class and third-class railroad tracks. The express company
contended that it had a constitutional right to be heard on the
classification of the railroad tracks, since this classification determined the amount of the tax imposed upon it, but Mr. Justice
McKenna answered unconsolingly:
"But the fact of the classification of railroads was one
that preceded the Express Company, of which it was aware,
and was an element in the estimate of the privilege that was
to be granted, for over the railroads the privilege could only
be exercised. There was no element of judicial inquiry.
The tax was the condition of a privilege to carry on a business,-might, indeed, be denominated a license; but call it
privilege or license, it was a condition the state could impose,
and, having the option to impose it could fix its amount directly or by reference to a standard."
An assessment of telegraph lines at not less than $66oo for
each mile of streets used was sustained in New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Telegraph Co. v. Dolan 14 which forgave the absence of any hearing as to the valuation on the ground that the
valuation was not of the company's property but of the privilege
granted to put poles in the streets. The case applies to a flat asSupra, note g.

"265 U. S. 96,44 Sup. Ct. 450 (1924).
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sessment of a privilege to be taxed at regular rates the same rule
that obtains with respect to flat fees. Where there is nothing to
be heard about, the taxpayer is not entitled to be heard.'5
It is established that where notice and hearing are constitutional prerequisites, such notice and hearing must be provided for
by statute and that it is not enough that the complainant chanced
to get a hearing by the grace or favor of the administrative authority. In evident reliance on this canon, a lot owner who had in
fact been before a city council and had succeeded in securing
modifications of a proposed plan of street improvement, but who
had never asked for a hearing on the public necessity of the improvement or the validity or amount of his assessment, sought to
resist the assessment in Hetrick v. Lindscy ' because the Ohio
statutes failed to provide for notice and hearing before the city
council. The statutes, however, gave him an opportunity to contest in the courts the validity and fairness of the assessment, and
he had urged his contentiohs in the common pleas court and then
on appeal in the county court of Sandusky County, and from the
latter court had secured a reduction of his assessment. A petition in error to the Supreme Court of Ohio! was thrown out on
the ground that no leave had been granted to file it as required
by the state practice and that the case did not come within the exceptional class of cases involving an issue under the Federal Constitution, because the Ohio statutes had so frequently been held
constitutional by the Ohio courts that the objection to them was
frivolous. From this dismissal of the petition a writ of error to
the Supreme Court of the United States was allowed by the chief
justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. The only issue there fought
was the statutory failure to accord a hearing before the council,
but the Supreme Court through Chief Justice Taft announced
that it has been frequently decided that the opportunity to be
heard on all the issues in subsequent judicial proceedings "consti"%NWhether a taxpayer is entitled to. a hearing is dealt with in 23 MIcH. L
Rxv. 92x (ig25).
2265 U. S. 384,44 Sup. Ct 486 (1924).
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tutes due process of law and supplies every requirement for due
notice and hearing." 17
It appears inferentially from the meagre opinion of Mr.
Justice McReynolds in louse v. Road Improvement District "I
that statutory notice of a proposed special assessment is sufficient
and that the persons in the district designated are not entitled to
actual notice. The complaint alleged that the statute authorized
and the commissioners gave only seventeen days notice and that
the complainant had no actual notice. The state court had held
that "the statute allowed twenty-eight days after the first publication during which time the petitioner might have objected to the
assessment, and declared that this was adequate; also that when
read in connection with the statute the notice sufficiently described
the lands." After reciting this holding, Mr. Justice McReynolds
declared: "Accepting the statute as construed by the state court,
the suggested objections to its validity appear to us wholly wanting in merit."
One of the objections to an assessment of special benefits
from a street grading improvement in issue in Butters v. Oakland 19 was that the proceedings under which the assessments
were determined made no provision "for the ascertainment and
adjustment of damages occasioned to abutting owners by a
change of grade." It appeared, however, that "the statute simply
authorizes the collection of the assessment, but does not interfere with the right of the taxpayer whose property may be injured thereby to receive compensation, or to enjoin the doing of
the work until it is ascertained and paid." Two of the plaintiffs
in the case had in fact made use of other available remedies to
recover compensation from the city. The Supreme Court wasted
no words in ruling that there was nothing to the objection that
the assessment of damages should be provided for in the proceedings for assessing the benefits.
" Due process in tax assessment is discussed in 2 Wis. L. REv. 235 (1923);
equalization, in 18 I.L- L. REV. 209 (1923); powers of boards of equalization
and reversion, in 71 U. OF PA. L. REV. 403 (1923) ; jurisdiction of court to confirm assessments in 18 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1924).
is266 U. S. I75, 45 Sup. Ct 6o (1924).
2263

U. S. I62, 44 Sup. Ct. 62 (1923).
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A taxpayer who objected to an assessment on the ground
that he had had no notice and chance to be heard before the assessment became final learned from McGregor v. Hogan 20 that
under the statutes of his state he had notice from the assessors
and an opportunity to object to the assessment in proceedings
before a board of arbitrators and that this is enough, since the
assessment of the county officers is not final and conclusive.
After receipt of notice of the'assessment Mr. McGregor had declined to ask for an arbitration for the later assigned reason that
he was advised by counsel that in an earlier case the Supreme
Court had held the arbitration clause of the statute unconstitutional. He now learns from Mr. Justice Sanford that the Supreme Court did not hold the clause unconstitutional. It held
merely that if for reasons not attributable to the taxpayer the
arbitration proceedings failed to result in any action by the arbitrators so that thereby the assessment of the county board became
conclusive, as the state court held, the assessment was invalid for
want of notice and hearing before the authority that under the
special circumstances actually made the final assessment. In the
present case failure to apply at all for an arbitration was held to
foreclose any right to complain in court that the assessment was
21
unconstitutional.
3. Quantum of Assessmicnt
A contention that a valuation of the intangible property of
a railroad, made by assessors on their independent judgment without direction or restraint from any mandatory rules in the stat"263 U. S. 234, 44 Sup. Ct. 50 (1923). See 22 Mxcn. L REV. 385 (1923).
For another case involving the arbitration preceding under the Georgia statutes.
see Bobler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. 431 (1925), infra, page 590.
' Problems in part of assessment are involved in the discussion in 25 CoL
L. REv. 243 (1925) on the application of a stock transfer act to transfers made
during readjustment, in 7i U. or PA. L. REv. 290 (1923) on the question whether
mortgages on corporate property are taxable by the state or by the county, and
in 33 YALE L J. 671 (924) on the question whether income accrued during the
administration of an estate can be included in the assessment of an inheritance
tax.
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ute, was so excessive as to amount to a taking of prol rty with22
out due process of law was rejected in Baker s.Druesedow
upon the finding that there was no evidence of arbitrary action,
fraud or gross error in the system on which the valuation was
made and upon the ruling that mere errors of judgment are not
subject to review in a proceeding to enjoin the collection of the
tax. Mr. Justice Brandeis sheds no.light on the way to fix the
point at which apparent error attains the dignity of gross error,
but the decision can hardly encourage taxpayers to look for judicial clemency even in extreme cases. Though the net earnings of
the company for the year before the tax was levied were less than
$7o,ooo, the state board had found a tangible value of over
$28,ooo,ooo and an intangible value of over $io,ooo,ooo. The
assessors must have had visions of better days to come to find
such a value in excess of tangible value when the company had
not earned enough to pay its fixed charges and had in consequence
passed into the hands of receivers. Complaints of the company
against the statute itself were dismissed by saying that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid double taxation or the taxation of intangible property estimated by deducting tangible value
2
from total value. 3

A complaint that due-process had been denied by taxes based
on excessive valuations made on wrong principles was left comfortless in Southern Railway Co. v. JVatts,24 except as there was
comfort in learning that there had been ample opportunity to be
heard which had been availed of, that there was no suggestion of
bad faith, that "at the most there have been errors of judgment,"
and that "mere errors of judgment are not subject to review in
these proceedings."
On the ground that the state court had rightly regarded the
tax as not a property tax but a privilege tax for occupying the
"263

U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct 40 (1923).

(1924) is a note on a case approving an assessment of property at its fair cash value, notwithstanding a long lease at a rental
less than the present market. Problems of state income taxation are dealt with
in 24 CoL. L. R-v. 316 (1924) on the computation of losses on the sale of
capital, and in 36 HAav. L. R-v. io32 (923) on a Wisconsin decision holding
stock dividends to be income within the state statute.
24260
U5. S. 519, 43 Sup. Ct. 192 (1923).

=In

24 CoL. L. REV. 324
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actually received, but by the larger amount which she would have
received if there had been no federal estate tax, was told by Mr.
Justice Stone in Stebbins & Hurley v. Riley .7that, quite apart
from a possible power on the part of the state to tax inheritances
as arbitrarily as it pleases, the state has power to tax the privilege of the testator to transmit as well as the privilege of the
legatee to receive, and that there is nothing arbitrary in having
the amount of the tax on the legacy determined in part by the
size of the estate left by the testator, as is done indirectly by the
provision that in determining the amount of the property transferred there shall be no deduction of the federal estate tax.
The ruling that the federal tax need not be deducted in assessing the state tax was reaffirmed in Frick v. Pennsylvania2'
against the complaint that failure to deduct is inconsistent with
the constitutional supremacy of the United States and makes the
state tax in part a tax on the federal tax. The state is not taxing
the federal tax, says Mr. Justice Van Devanter, but is taxing the
transfer of particular property and not such property depleted
by the federal tax. The states and the United States have concurrent power to tax, and both may exercise their respective pow29
ers as of the same moment.

0 though already
Another point in Frick v. Pennsylvania,"
covered in the preceding section on Jurisdiction, may be noted
here. This is the holding that an inheritance tax of the domiciliary state must deduct from the assessment of shares of stock in
foreign corporations such taxes as the chartering state imposes
as a condition of allowing the transfer of the stock. Though the
considerations underlying this ruling are considerations of jurisdiction, the issue is not one of total immunity as it is with chattels
located outside the state. The corporate stock is within the jurisdiction of the domiciliary state through its power over intangibles
owned by residents, but the assessment of the tax must exclude
=268 17. S. 137, 45 Sup. Ct 424 (192S).
"268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (i925).

"Inheritance taxation in some of its broader aspects is considered in Michael.
Kenny, Is Inheritancea Right?, S LoYoLA L. J. 183 (x923).
Supra, note 2A

DUE PROCESS TESTS OF STATE TAXATION,

19-22-1925

587

the cost of securing the consent of another state to the transfer
which is the subject of the tax. This decision is surprising
and puzzling, in view of the familiar phenomenon-of duplicate
taxation of the same economic interest by various states on differing theories as to the legal res on which the several taxes are imposed. Though the Supreme Court made new law in holding that
outside chattels are not within the jurisdiction of the domiciliary
state from the standpoint of a property tax or an inheritance
tax, this new law proceeds along familiar lines of ruling that
situs follows locus and cannot exist without it. The novelty of
the law on extra-state chattels was a novelty in application of
widely-accepted canons. The novelty of the law that the assessment of a taxable something must deduct other taxes on the same
taxable something is a novelty in the creation of a new criterion
to apply. An economic interest and a legal res are subjected to a
judicial split on the model of the famous judgment of Solomon.
This is difficult to square with any principles or theories of
tax jurisdiction heretofore obtaining. As a principle of jurisdiction, it offers a prospect of intellectual dizziness to anyone
who contemplates its possible extensions and applications. If
the stock is not wholly within the jurisdiction of' the domiciliary
state but is partly within its jurisdiction, how can it be wholly
within the jurisdiction of the chartering state? The chartering
state is not the only one that can put impediribents in the way of
the transfer of the stock. The state where the certificate rests
and the state where some transfer agent acts may demand a price
for consenting to operations that may be essential to a completely
effective transfer. What is to be the rule about property taxes
and about other forms of intangible property? Must the domicile
deduct a tax imposed by the state of mortgaged realty or the state
in which capital has acquired a business situs? Must these states
in turn deduct taxes imposed by the domiciliary state? States
where the debtor is domiciled or where a note is located may impose inheritance taxes but not property taxes. Inheritance taxes
paid to those states would seem to come within the same class as
an inheritance tax paid to the state which charters a corporation.
The chartering state and the states where there is mortgaged
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property or where a business situs is established may impose
property taxes as well as inheritances taxes. Why should their
property taxes not be deducted from the assessment of property
taxes in the domiciliary state, if their inheritance taxes must be
thus deducted from the assessment of inheritance taxes of the
domiciliary state?
These are questions of such intricacy and difficulty that even
the late Chief Justice White could hardly say of them that to ask
them is to answer them. We can prophesy that the Supreme Court
will have a pernickety task in answering them if it deals with
them as questions of jurisdiction. It will be much simpler to
deal with them as questions of the reasonableness of assessment.
Even then it is hard to say why from the standpoint of the taxpaver there is a significant difference between taxes imposed by
some other state and taxes imposed by the United States. The
United States can collect its tax as effectively as can any other
state. It may not be able to interfere with the transfer but it
can pounce upon the transferor and the transferee and thereby
see to it that the transfer is not fiscally free and clear. To raise
these questions is certainly not to answer them. Either the Supreme Court must back-track or it must create a new lot of diversities in the law of taxation where there is in all conscience
enough diversity already. It will be as interesting to observe the
process as it will be intricate to articulate it.
Under the head of quantum of assessment might also be
chronicled the cases in which the applications of the unit rule
have been questioned on the ground that "they expose the heel
to a mortal dart," i e., "open to taxation what is not
within the state." -3 These cases of the assessment of extraterritorial values have been recited in the section on Jurisdiction.
Among them is Air-Way Electric Corporation v. Day 32 which
holds that a state may not measure an excise on foreign corporations by a fraction of its authorized, rather than its issued.
non-par stock. There is in the.opinion a flavor of the idea that
"Mr. Justice Holmes, in Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69, 40 Sup. Ct.
43S (..).
33 66 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (x924), 74 V). OF PA. L RZEv. 449 (1926).
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such a measure which includes non-existent property may take
toll of values without the state. The precise ground of the decision, however, is that the standard set is so whimsical and arbitrary that it offends against some ideal judicially incorporated
in the requirement of equal-protection of the laws. It seems
pretty clear that the result would have been the same had the
complainant adduced the due-process clause alone and not the
equal-protection clause. The impropriety in the mode of assessment was not the inclusion in the base of values outside the state
not susceptible of comparison with values in the state through the
application' of some appropriate ratio, but it was the inclusion
in the base of wholly fictitious and as yet non-existent values.
The real issue in such a case should be whether it is not fair
enough to use as a measure an authorization to issue stock which
the company of its own free will sought and obtained from the
state of its charter.
Other assessments are alleged under the equal-protection
clause to be excessive because the assessors habitually and intentionally value the complainant's property at a greater percentage
of its worth than they value other corresponding prope-ty or because the determination of benefits assumed to flow from a special
improvement are in excess of the actual benefit or do not correspond with the actual benefit as closely as the assessment on other
property corresponds with the benefit actually derived by it.
Cases which adjudicate these issues are to be reviewed elsewhere.3 3 In only five of the cases did the taxpayer secure relief.
34 has just been noted.
Air-Way Electric Corporationv. Day
35
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota, reiterated the established
principle that "intentional, systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the
constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his property," and sent itself back to the state court for ascertainment of
'Supreme

Court Condonations and Condemnations of Discrimirnatori

State Taxation, Ix9-x925. In VIRGA

LAw REviEw

for April and May, i96.

Supra, note 32.

26o U. S. 441, 43 Sup. Ct. xgo (1923).
and 36 HARv. L.Pv. ioo,i029 (z923).
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the facts. South Utah M1ines & Smelters v. Beaver County .
disapproved of the application to a dwindling deposit of tailings
of a statute assessing metalliferous mines and mining claims by
some multiple or submultiple of the net annual proceeds. The
court, however, avoided technical constitutional condemnation by
construing the state statute as not designed to cover such a refuse
heap. Bohler v. Callaway -I-sustained the district court in reducing an assessment of intangibles to one-fourth of their actual
value on a showing that corresponding undervaluation was intentional and habitual in the case of real estate and intangibles generally. Thomas v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. 38 saved a
railroad company with forty acres of land and three and a half
miles of track in a drainage and levee district from having 'to
bear 57 per cent. of the cost of a drainage improvement when
12,ooo acres of rich farm land, of which nine-tenths would-be
multiplied in value six times as a result of the improvement, was
made to bear only 43 per cent. of its cost.
V.

COLLECTION

The question whether sellers of gasoline may be forced to
serve as collecting agents of a tax on sales was answered in the

affirmative in Pierce Oil Corporationv. Hopkins.s9 To the objection that the seller is required to pay a tax laid on purchasers
when he lacks the means of reimbursing himself and to the com-

plaint that the process of collecting the tax and making monthly
reports and payments subjects the seller to an appreciable ex-

pense, Mr. Justice Brandeis replied that "a short answer to this
argument is that the seller is directed to collect the tax from the
purchaser when he makes his sale; and that a state which has,
under its constitution, power to regulate the business of selling
gasoline (and doubtless, also, the power to tax the privilege of
"262 U. S. 325, 43 Sup. Ct. 577 (1923).

267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct 431 (1925).
3261 U. S. 481, 43 Sup. Ct. 44o (1923).
3264
U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 25! (1924). supra, note ii.
REv. 6j8 (1924).

See

22 MicH. L.
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carrying on that business), is not prevented by the due process
burden." 40
clause from -imposing the incidental
Minor matters relating to the mode of collecting taxes are
involved in a number of cases already considered. Bankers Trust
Co. v. Blodgett 41 and Bohlcr v. Callaway 42 illustrate the use of
types of Ferret Acts which put back taxes or new taxes on the
property of decedents who succeeded in evading taxes thereon
of
during their days of greater vigilance. Thus the certainty
43 and
assessments
Curative
taxes.
of
death adds to the certainty
modes
retroactive income taxes 44 may also be noted as unusual
5
of collection. Southeastern Express Co. v. Millcr 4'sanctioned
the imposition of a penalty equal to the amount of the tax before
entering upon doing business, although those already in business
had thirty days of grace before liability to penalty. Puget Sound
Power & Light Co. v. King County 46 approved of assessing all
the property of a street railroad as personal property, 'although
the real estate thus treated as personal property became subject
to more drastic provisions for the collection of taxes than those
applicable to real estate generally. The date of payment was advanced, the penalties for delinquency were increased, and sale
or less connected with the collection of taxes are dealt with

* Problems more
of Conin Renzo D. Bowers, Special Assessment s. Mortgage Lien: In Evzent Coleman,
M.
flict, Which Holds Priority, 32 'YALE L. J. 46o (1923); Robert
Tax Titles in Kentucky, 12 Ky. L. J.'77 (923); Frank T. Sutton, Jr., The

Effect of an Act to Release Liens Upon Real Estate for Taxes, 1o VA. L RE&
(1923) on an unsuccessful at785 (1925) ; and notes in 9 CORNE . L.Q. 334 New
York assets of a Vermont
tempt by Veripont to make New York transmit
decedent so that Vermont might collect a tax thereon; in 24 CoL. L REV. 317
L.
19 ILL.
(1924) on denial of mandamus to compel property to be taxed; in L. J. 245
in ii Ky.
REV.279 (1924) on publicity of state income tax returns; tax where the state
(1922) on proceedings to vacate a judgment for a small
Ky. L. J.246
claims that the smallness of the amount was due to fraud; in 12 (1925)
on lien
(1923) on redemption of land sold for taxes; in i Tax. L. REv.

on tracts separately assessed; and in Ii VA. L. Rnv. (1924) -on constitutionality
of a statute releasing liens for old unpaid taxes.
4326o U. S. 647, 43 Sup. Ct. 233 (923), supra, note 7.
* 267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. (925), supra, note 37.

a Charlotte Harbor & Northern Railway Co. v. Wells, 26o U. S. 8, 43 Sup.
Ct. 3 (1922), supra, note 5.
" Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct.
620 (z923).
a264 U. S. 535, 44 Sup. Ct 421 (1924), supra, notes 9, z3 and 26.
40264 U. S. 22, 44 SUp. Ct 261 (1924).
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for non-payment of taxes could be enforced earlier and without
right of redemption.
VI. MODES OF RELIEF AGAINST ALLEGED UNLAWFUL
TAXES

A contention that the complaint of a taxpayer against an expenditure of money could not be considered because the state
official against whom the bill was originally brought was no
longer in office was denied in Boston v. Jacksolt 47 on the ground
that the substitution of the successor as defendant had taken place
in the state court before consideration of the case on its merits,
which settled conclusively that the state law authorized the substitution. This was differentiated from an action brought originally in the federal court in which substitution is unauthorized
by relevant statute. A further contention that the case on writ
of error before the Supreme Court had become moot because the
moneys collected had already been devoted to the contested use
was cared for by pointing out that the payment had taken place
before the case was considered by the highest court of the state,
and it was therefore to be assumed that the state court had found
that the bill was directed against future payments and assessments.
A few months later the question arose in Gorlam Manufacturing Co. v. Wendell 48 whether an action brought in the federal
court against one set of state tax officials could be maintained
against their successors substituted with their consent This was
held to depend upon whether the state law authoriied the substitution. The New York law was far from explicit on the point,
but there was an opinion of the Court of Appeals which inclined
in favor of such substitution with consent of the successors and
this was taken by Chief.Justice Taft as sufficient. He referred
to the desirability of such substitution and observed that "for
this reason, where such officers, on behalf of state or county,
consent to the substitution, the federal courts .need not be astute
4?26o

U. S. 309, 43 Sup. Ct. 129 (1922), 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 434 (1926).

"261

U. S. 1,43 Sup. Ct. 313 (1923).
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to enforce the abatement of the suit if any basis at all can be
found in sate law or the practice of the state courts for substitution of the successors in office."
A property owner who voluntarily connected his premises
with a sewer and enjoyed the benefits thereof was held in St.
49
Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. PrendergastConstruction Co.
to be estopped to contest the validity of the assessment either for
failure to receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
as to the fixing of the limits of the district or the apportionment
of the cost on various parcels or on the ground that other areas
equally benefited were wrongfully excluded from the district described. While Mr. Justice McKenna confines himself to inquiring whether the state court actually decided the case on the
ground of estoppel against the complainant and assumes that such
a state ruling is proper, the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed
the decree of the state court instead of dismissing the writ of
error shows that the question whether constitutional complaints
may be barred by accepting benefits is one raising an issue under
the Fourteenth Amendment and not wholly a matter of state law.
From the argument on behalf of the complainant that the chief
justice of the state court would not have grantea the petition for
writ of error if the state court had decided the case wholly on
the ground of local law, Mr. Justice McKenna draws the inference of a concession that "if the estoppel was ruled, it was adequate to justify the court's decree." This inference does not
seem inexorably inexorable.
Failure to seek administrative amelioration before the assessment complained of became a final one cost the taxpayer in
50
First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners -the
chance to maintain a suit in the courts to determine whether its
property had been relatively overvalued so as to deny it the equal
protection of the laws. Under the procedure provided by the
state, the assessor transmitted the assessment to the county board
of equalization. After the assessment was approved by the county
a26o U. S. 469, 43 Sup. Ct. x78 (1923).
"264 U. S. 450, 44 Sup. Ct. 385 (1924).
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board, the assessor transmitted it to the state tax commission. The
commission decided that all the property within the county had
been undervalued and recommended a horizontal increase, which
was approved by the state board of equalization. The assessor
then made the increase thus commanded. The taxpayer sat quiescent while all these things were taking place. The state court in
another case between the same parties over taxes levied in a previous year had held that these various boards were- required by
statute to meet at certain places on certain days and to finish
their work within designatcd dates, that the taxpayer was entitled to appear before them and urge considerations affecting the
amount of his assessment, and that his failure to take advantage
of the opportunity thus offered to him by statute foreclosed him
from seeking judicial relief. This construction of the state statute by the state court was declared by Mr. Justice SU'therland
to be binding on the Supreme Court.
To a contention by the taxpayer that, the function of the
county board of equalization was a public duty and not a private
remedy, Mr. Justice Sutherland, in distinguishing a precedent
relied on, declared that "a very different question is presented
here, where the same board has affirmed both assessments, is expressly vested by statute with the power of equalization, and may
exert its power at the instance of any one aggrieved," citing state
cases in support of this analysis. Nowhere in the opinion is it
pointed out that the action of the revisory boards did not relate
specifically to the complainant's particular assessment and that
the complainant had no definite knowledge that anything affecting him would in fact be done. He knew only that something
affecting him might be done. The decision, however, seems to
put upon a taxpayer in such a situation a burden to appear before the board and find out if something of concern to him is to
be taken up. This invites the nuisance of having every taxpayer
in the district affected appear before the board. Against this implication of the practical effect of the decision, -it should be said
that there were three boards higher than the assessor and that in
the case at bar there was a chance to find out that the state tax
commission had raised the assessment before this action was ap-
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proved by the state board of equalization. More important still
is the fact that the foundation of the complaint was that the original assessor had assessed bank stock at its full value while other
property was assessed at a fraction of its value. This initial discrimination .was merely enhanced or varied by the action of the
higher authorities. It may well be, therefore, that this particulax complainant had been sleeping after ample provocation to get
roused to action; but the precise effect of the case on taxpayers
generally would have been more certain if the opinion had discussed the importance or unimportance of the fact that no individual taxpayer could know in advance that anything affecting
him individually was to be done. What cost the taxpayer his
chance in the courts was failure to seek the administration before the levy was completed, for after that time the complainant
had applied for a rebate and abatement which had been approved
by the county board but disallowed by the state tax commission.
A contention that it would, have been futile to have sought a hearing before the commission because its action was not subject to
judicial review was dismissed by saying that a judicial appeal is
not a matter of right but dependent upon statute and that it cannot be assumed that argument would not move the commission
to grant proper relief. A further complaint that the time for
hearings before the commission was not adequate was quashed
with the remark that the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that
there was not time for a hearing, in the absence of any effort to
obtain one.5 '
"aProblems of relief against alleged unlawful state taxes are discussed in
notes in 4 BosTox U. L. REv. 279 (1924) and 22 MicH. L. REV. 594 (1924) On
injunction as a remedy against unlawful taxes, in 8 Mumx. L. REV. 538 (1924)
on a case holding that a suit against the state controller is not a suit against the
state, in 9 MARQUE L. J. 193 (1924) on a decision that an excessive assessment is not a taking of property without due process when the taxpayer has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and in 11 VA. L. REv. 134 (1924)
on the question when payment of a tax is to be considered involuntary from the
standpoint of recovery back.
On modes of relief against federal taxes see Russell L. Bradford, The Steps
Necessary in an Action or the Recovery of Taxes from the Federal Government, 9 VA. L. REV. 5ox, 67 (1924) ; Gilmer Korner, The United States Board
of Tax Appeals, ii A. B. A. Joua. 642 (1925) ; Clarence A. Miller. Restraining
the Collection of Federal Taxes and Penalties by Injunction, 71 U. OF PA. L
REV. 318 (1923) ; and notes in 22 Cot L. REV. 761 (1922) ; 37 HARV. L REV.
255, 276 (1923); and ii VA. L. REv. 628 (1925).
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Over the objection of the tax authorities that judicial relief
should be denied because the complainant had not exhausted his
administrative remedies, an injunction in the federal district
court was nevertheless granted and sustained in Boher v. Callaway 52 upon the analysis of the state procedure that the only possible relief open to the complainant in state tribunals was a petition in equity in the state court. This proceeding was found to
be not an administrative proceeding but a judicial one. All administrative acts in making the assessment had been completed,
and the state law gave no right of action to recover back taxes
voluntarily paid even under protest. Upon this finding that the
state court could not make an administrative assessment, but
could only enjoin excessive assessment, Chief Justice Taft declared that "no reason existed why a federal court sitting in
the same jurisdiction might not grant equitable relief to the taxpayer against the executions on the assessments, provided there
be stated in the bill ground for federal equity jurisdiction." "
The invalidity of the assessments was predicated on the fact that
other similar property was assessed systematically and intentionally at one-fourth of its value while the property in question had
under a Ferret Act been assessed for seven back years at its full
value. The assessment complained of was for seven years ending in 1917 and the first proceeding to contest it had been begun
in 1919. This was an arbitration proceeding which gave an
award satisfactory to the taxpayer, but which the tax collector
U267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. 431 (1925),

supra, notes 37 and 42.

The question in Wilson v. Illinois Southern Railway Co., 263 U. S. 574, 44
Sup. Ct. 203 (1924). was whether there was adequate remedy at law so that
equitable relief should be denied. The substantive complaint was that the property of the company in several counties had been relatively overvalued by a state
board. The remedy at law which the taxing authorities urged as a barrier to
equitable relief was a chance to raise the issue of discrimination by way of defense to suits brought by the various counties to enforce the tax. In holding
that this was not an adequate remedy sufficient to defeat equitable interposition.
Mr. Justice Holmes said that "not only would those suits be many, but there
would be insuperable difficulty in determining what the proper assessment
against the whole road should be. and. in apportioning the due share to the
county concerned." Another statutory provision allowing an appeal from the
state tax commission to the courts for inquiring into'the "lawfulness" of the
assessment was subjected to the comment that "how far such an appeal would be
adequate upon a charge of fraud against the commission may be doubted, and
the adequacy of a remedy at law must be clear."
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of the
declined to follow although the state court had on suit
coland
receiver
the
county and state twice declined to enjoin
to
according
lector from making the assessments and collections
folthe arbitration. This second refusal was in 1922. It was
To
i919.
of
assessment
lowed by executions on the original
was
court
district
resist these executions, the bill in the federal
filed on March :22, 1922. The taxpayer contended that the action
of the state court in refusing to enjoin the collector from recognizing the arbitration proceeding made the issue of the validity
of the arbitration award res adjudicata, but the Supreme Court
found the denial of the injunction to be only a temporary ruling
which should not have the effect of estoppel by judgment. On
its own, however, the Supreme Court agreed with the district
court that the award was a nullity because the statute authorizing
it had been repealed before the award took place. But the decision of the district court and the Supreme Court on the issue of
discrimination was the same as that of the arbitrators. The case
was argued in the Supreme Court on January 14"and 15, 1925,
and decided on April 13, 1925. The story suggests that something is awry in the state of Georgia and perhaps elsewhere if
such a simple issue takes so long to get settled.
While the arbitration proceeding provided by Georgia was
to
still treated as being available, a taxpayer who failed to resort
4
chance
his
forfeited
it was held in McGregor v. Hogan 5 to have
to contest the validity of the assessment in the courts. The Geor19,
gia state court decision in the case was handed down on May
prostatutory
the
of
1922, and contained no hint of any demise
vision for arbitration.
Complaints against the allocation of income under the New
York excise on corporations were left unconsidered in Gorham
Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax ComizIssion 5 because the dissatisfied silversmiths had rushed to the federal court for an ina
junction without first applying to the state tax commission for
New
the
as
tax,
the
of
revision of the account and a resettlement
York statute gave it a right to do.
54263
63266

50 (1923), suf'ra, note 20.
U. S..265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80 (1924).

U. S. 234, 44 Sup. Ct.
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Where a special assessment is fixed tentatively by a commission on an ad zalorem basis of apportionment, but there is a
chance to go before the commission and ask for a reduction of
the assessment, Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District 56 closes the door of the court to one who does not avail himself of his administrative opportunity.
The same result was reached in Canzpbell v. Olney 17 where
objections that a city should have had a special ordinance authorizing the particular sidewalk assessment were not considered owing to the fact that the objector had failed to take advantage of
his chance to appear before the city council or of his chance to
bring a suit to set aside the assessment at any time within twenty
days after it had been made.
Thus it appears that in six out of the seven cases in which
the issue arose, taxpayers were held to have forfeited the right to
judicial consideration by reason of their failure to seek first the
administrative remedies or the self-help open to them. During
the three terms of court under review there were fifty-one cases
in which state taxes were tested under the due-process and the
equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The nature of the proceeding and the court, state or federal, in which
the cases originated may be outlined as follows:
State Court FederalCourt
Injunctions,
Suits to Recover Taxes Paid,
Suits to Collect Taxes,
Statutory Modes of Review,

Total

19

13

32

3
Ii
3

2
..

5
11

--

3

36

15

51

This shows that injunction is the favorite remedy of taxpayers and almost the only remedy sought in actions begun in
the federal courts. The alleged unconstitutionality of the tax
and the irreparability of injury due in the main to the absence of
M262 U. S. 710,43 Sup. Ct. 694 (1923), 74 U. OF P.,. L. REv. 433 (1926).
a-62 U. S. 352, 43 Sup. Ct. 559 (1923).
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satisfactory remedies at law are the foundations of equitable
jurisdiction. States which wish to keep tax cases in their own
courts should see to it that they provide such modes of relief that
there will be no ground for the interposition of equity. They
may thereby reduce the dockets of the federal district courts and
subject themselves to the United States Supreme Court only after
determination of the issue by the highest court of the state.
VII. CoNcLusION
Of the fifty-one cases in which state taxes were questioned
under the Fourteenth Amendment during the past three terms of
court only eight were decided in favor of the taxpayer. Four of
these successful contests deal only with discrimination peculiar to
the particular complainant.5n Three of these cases arose in the
federal district court and two 5 9 of them were there decided in
favor of the taxpayer. The fourth case of this class came from the
state court and reversed that court for not inquiring whether
there was habitual and intentional discrimination in assessment of
comparable property. 60 All that the taxpayer got was a chance
to contest the issue of discrimination.
The other four cases in favor of taxpayrs settled matters
of wider importance. State courts were reversed in three cases
in which the Supreme Court laid down that a state may not impose a special assessment on land for an improvement made at
61
some past time when the land was owned by the United States,
that a state may not tax the securing of a policy of insurance outside the state,6 2 and that an inheritance tax of a domiciliary state
must neglect chattels not within the state and must deduct from
the assessment of corporate stock such tax as is demanded by the
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota, supra, note 35; South Utah Mines &
Smelters v. Beaver County, supra, note 36; Bohler v. Callaway, supra, note 37;
Thomas v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., supra, note 38.
' Bohler v. Callaway, supra, note 37; Thomas v. Kansas City Southern
Railway Co., supra, note 38.
* Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota, supra, note 36.
' Lee v. Osceola & Little River Road Improvement District, supra, note 6.
' St. Louis Colton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 26o U. S. 346, 43 Sup. Ct.
125 (1922), 74 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 444 (1926).
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state in which the corporation is chartered as a price of consent-ing fo the transfer.A3 The fourth case of this class reversed the
federal district court and held that an excise tax on a f:3reign corporation may not be measured by the amount of authorized rather
than issued capital stock.0 4 In these eight cases, state courts
were reversed in four cases out of thirty-six, and federal courts
were reversed in two cases out of fifteen. These reversals were
all that there were-a total of six out of fifty-one cases.
This record may well suggest to taxpayers and their counsel
the foolishness of carrying picayune appeals to the Supreme
Court of the United States. It may suggest also the foolishness
of a governmental system which makes it possible to carry picayune appeals t& the Supreme Court of the United States. Much
may be said in favor of not suffering a state court to be the final
drbiter of a question whether the state has exceeded its jurisdiction, since a court above the courts of the several states may work
out more satisfactory canons of jurisdiction than can the courts
of the several states. Something approaching system may come
from the United States Supreme Court, where we might get
from state courts a chaos of multiple taxes on the sane economic
interest or a hiatus of complete escape from taxation. A Supreme Court decision which puts a subject matter without the
jurisdiction of one state necessarily lays down a rule that, it is
within the jurisdiction of another. When, however, we come to
matters no broader than the issue of relative fairness to an individual taxpayer, there is much to be said in favor of a system
that would leave the complainant to the tough or-tender mercies
of the courts of his own state. it would be better to suffer a few
outrageous state decisions than to allow myriad minor and purely
personal complaints to go to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Thomas Reed Powell.
Harvard Law School.

" Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, note 3o.
" Air-Way Electric Corporation v. Day, supra, note
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